Topics On The Table Issue 2
Recently, the U.S. House of Representatives passed legislation to correct the U.S. Supreme Court's egregious decision in Ledbetter v. Goodyear Tire, in which the Court ignored the realities of the workplace, and ruled that pay discrimination claims could only be filed within 180 days of when the employer's discriminatory decision was made. The 5-4 decision slammed the courthouse door on people like Lilly Ledbetter, who was still being paid significantly less than her male counterparts because of sex discrimination by her supervisors decades ago.
Questions to consider:
If a majority of the justices on the U.S. Supreme Court insist on ignoring the Congressional intent behind a statute, how can the legislative branch ensure that statutes are interpreted as they are meant?
Are judges and justices who interpret a statute to conflict with the stated purpose behind the law engaging in "judicial activism"?
What other decisions by the Roberts Court should Congress attempt to overturn legislatively?
What do you think?
Click here to learn more about Ledbetter v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co.
Responses:
Danielle, Senior
Macalester College
In the Lily Ledbetter case, the Court decided that Ms. Ledbetter is not entitled to equal pay on the basis that she did not bring the case against her employers within the 180-day filing period since the discrimination. In deciding this way, the Supreme Court ignored the Congressional intent behind the Title VII Pay Discrimination Claims. More significantly, this decision struck a harsh blow to equal pay discrimination and women's rights. The legislative branch is hard-pressed, unfortunately, to ensure that statutes are interpreted by the Supreme Court as they are meant to be. Particularly in light of the separation of powers and the independence of the judicial branch, the notion that any legislation which is passed by Congress should be held as word by the judicial branch toes the line on this constitutional separation of powers. The analogy of constitutional interpretation re: the Court's historical relationship with it, also maintains as evidence of why the legislature is hard-pressed to ensure that the Supreme Court obeys Congressional intent. It speaks to the Court's almost inability to consistently adhere to the interpretation of the historical and original intent of the framers. Approaches in constitutional interpretation range from the philosophy that it should be textual or interpretivist, to the idea of the "living" Constitution. The Supreme Court has interpreted the constitution acting along their own philosophies of interpretation for as far as the eye can see ranging from "judicial activism" to "judicial restraint" This same approach, arguably, is akin to the reality of statutory law interpretation and embracing the Congressional intent behind legislation. However, the difficulty in holding constitutional interpretation to a certain standard, particularly to the intent of the framers, maintains as evidence that the same difficulty in interpreting Congressional intent will exist unpretentiously. I cannot conjure a feasible way that Congress can get the Courts to obey Congressional intent short of (very unrealistically) an amendment to the constitution or a mechanism between Congress and the judiciary that blurs the line of separation of powers through allowing Congress to have more influence in the process of judicial decision-making. The most that Congress may be able to do is to ensure that their legislation is as precise and airtight as is possible, in order to increase the likelihood that the judiciary is more pressed to understand the original intent of the legislation. Congress' recent move to correct the Supreme Court's Ledbetter decision is commendable, and hopefully the Court will understand and respect the Congressional intent.
Sarah, Senior
Georgetown University
The Supreme Court's decision on the Lily Ledbetter case is a huge disappointment for not only women, but everyone looking to our government to secure equal rights for all. It seems that the Court has taken an overarching leap of judicial activism by clearly contradicting the purpose and intent of the Congressional statute by declaring Ms. Ledbetter ineligible to file her case when quite obviously Congress enacted the legislation to allow citizens like Ms Ledbetter to do just that and curb pay discrimination. It is comforting that Congress is working on further legislation to redress the action of the Court and remedy the outcome of this case, but perhaps it only puts the ball back in the Justice's literal and figurative Court. How Congress can ensure that their legislation's intent will be interpreted correctly before the Roberts Court is a challenging question and one that I'm afraid I can't find an answer to. We can only hope that the action by Congress will help to end discrimination, in the workplace and elsewhere, and combat the faulty logic and judicial activism of the current Supreme Court.
Naima, Senior
Yale University
The key to clear interpretation of the law is clear construction of the law. Congress must be ever-vigilant when crafting legislation that the means prescribed to achieve an intended end are sufficiently specific to prevent the Court and others from distorting its meaning. This is not to say that Congress must concern itself with minutia, but rather that Congress must be very precise in what the law requires. The need for precision is especially acute in areas of employment discrimination, where employers and others in power are quick to exploit any loopholes that might afford employees fewer rights. If Congress enacted Title VII with the belief that pay discrimination claims should be considered if filed within 180 days of when the employer last discriminated against the employee, rather than when the discrimination began, it is clear (at least in hindsight) that it must say so explicitly. I am glad that Congress is now making efforts to remedy this ambiguity, and I hope that it will revisit other areas of employment law to ensure that no other Lily Ledbetters go unprotected. With that being said, it is true that Congress cannot foresee every issue that will arise in the application of a particular law and that no piece of legislation will be entirely complete. For this reason, we hope that the Court will interpret the law with a mind to what Congress intended in enacting it. When the Court applies the letter of the law while ignoring its spirit, it is every bit as "activist" as when it invokes the spirit of the law while disregarding the letter. There is always some amount of discretion and "activism" in judicial interpretation, but the Court stands on the firmest footing when it applies the letter of the law with an eye to its underlying purpose. Unfortunately, I'm not sure whether Congress can overturn some of the other egregious decisions of the Roberts Court with legislative action. The Ledbetter case cried out for Congressional remedy as it involved the interpretation (or misinterpretation) of Congress' words. However, in some of the other cases handed down this term, there is little that Congress can do to change the Court's decision. For instance, in Gonzalez v. Carhart, the Roberts Court upheld the constitutionality of a state law banning a certain abortion procedure even though that law did not include an exception for a woman's health. The decision itself was particularly paternalistic and patronizing towards women, in addition to being unnecessarily graphic in its description of the procedure in question. Although Congress may disagree with the Court's allowance of this state legislative action, I'm not sure that there is a way for Congress to counter this behavior other than by abstaining from passing a similar law at the federal level. In the school desegregation cases, the Court struck down voluntary integration plans in Seattle and Louisville as unconstitutional. Again, I'm not certain what law could overturn this decision, although Congressional action to further integrate schools in other ways might go a long way to rendering the decision moot.
