Thomas I. Vanaskie - CONFIRMED

United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit

Thomas I. Vanaskie has been a judge on the United States District Court for the Middle District of Pennsylvania since 1994, and from 1999 to 2006 he served as the district's chief judge.  On August 7, 2009, President Obama nominated Judge Vanaskie to a seat on the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit.  President Obama commended Judge Vanaskie for his "exceptional dedication to [his] communit[y] through [his] work," and said that he would be a "diligent, judicious and esteemed addition[] to the Third [] Circuit bench[]."

A lifelong Pennsylvanian, Judge Vanaskie graduated from Lycoming College in 1975 and from Dickinson School of Law in 1978.  After law school, he clerked for United States District Judge William Joseph Nealon Jr. on the United States District Court for the Middle District of Pennsylvania.  Following his clerkship, Judge Vanaskie worked in private practice in Scranton, first at Dilworth, Paxson, Kalish, & Kauffman and then at Elliott, Vanaskie & Riley, from 1980 until he took his federal district court seat in 1994.  Judge Vanaskie's Pennsylvania ties connect him with Senator Bob Casey who described their relationship as follows: "Judge Vanaskie also has a long history with my family.  He practiced law with my father, Governor Robert P. Casey, and he administered the oath of office to me at my three swearing-in ceremonies when I served as Auditor General and State Treasurer."  Senator Casey also praised Judge Vanaskie, saying:  "Tom Vanaskie has served with distinction as a federal district court judge for 15 years.  His academic record, his work as a practicing lawyer and his work on the federal bench have been marked by a commitment to excellence.  As an appellate judge he will apply the law in a fair and impartial manner."

Our research, described in detail below, shows Judge Vanaskie to be a careful judge whose rulings are well-grounded in the law and the facts.  Lawyers who have appeared before him hold him in high esteem, according to the evaluations gathered by the Almanac of the Federal Judiciary.    Representative comments include:  "He is one of the best and smartest judges in the district." "He has the perfect demeanor for the bench."  "He runs the best trial.  He gives you ample opportunity to succeed or fail.  He is great with evidence, discovery, and all other facets of the process." Both civil and criminal practitioners almost uniformly describe him as fair and evenhanded, with only one commenter saying that "[h]e has the slightest pro-defense leaning."  With respect to criminal sentencing, lawyers describe him as "very compassionate and fair,"  "tough on white collar crimes," and "very sympathetic to the plight of some defendants."  Judge Vanaskie is also described as a judge who encourages settlement, with lawyer comments ranging from "[h]e is very good in the settlement area" to "[h]e wants to work with parties for settlement, but is not good at it."

Views on Judicial Independence

In 2001, Judge Vanaskie published a law review article entitled "The Independence and Responsibility of the Federal Judiciary," 46 Vill. L. Rev. 745 (2001).  In this article, Judge Vanaskie stresses the importance of an independent judiciary, but also places some responsibility for maintaining that independence on judges.  He argues that the "reciprocal obligation of judicial independence" is "judicial restraint," defined as "deciding cases in accordance with the discipline of legal reasoning, paying careful attention to the language of the statute or constitutional provision at issue, existing precedent and accumulated wisdom, coupled with that healthy distrust of the idea that judges must necessarily know better. . . ."  Id. at 776.  Judge Vanaskie urges this approach because it will lead to decisions that "are not based upon personal values or preferences," and accordingly discourage "assaults on judicial independence."  Id. at 766. 

Judge Vanaskie singled out for criticism the Supreme Court's Tenth Amendment jurisprudence -- where the Supreme Court upheld the application of minimum wage laws to state and local governments in 1968, reversed itself in 1976, and then reversed itself again and re-adopted its original position in 1985.  Id. at 767.  He concluded that "[h]aving three separate interpretations of the Tenth Amendment in a span of less than twenty years is at least suggestive of results that depend, now upon judicial decision-making, but rather on judicial value preferences.  Such an approach is not consistent with the rule of law, which requires stability and fair notice of what the law is."  Id.

Ultimately, Judge Vanaskie takes the position that the judiciary must self-regulate by using judicial restraint so that its decisions will "hold up to public scrutiny," id., and earn the respect of the executive and legislative branches so that "the federal judiciary can preserve the judicial independence needed to make unpopular decisions that are sometimes essential to the preservation of the rule of law," id at 776.  

First Amendment

Judge Vanaskie takes a thoughtful, fact-specific approach to First Amendment claims.  His rulings are well-reasoned and faithful to prior precedent.

In an employment case involving political party affiliation, Wetzel v. Tucker, No. 3:94-CV-660, U.S. Dist. LEXIS 22288 (M.D. Pa. Mar. 24, 1997), Judge Vanaskie ruled that the solicitor for a state hospital authority, a member of the Republican party, could be replaced by a member of the Democratic party following an election in which the composition of the County Commissioners who oversaw the authority switched from a Republican majority to a Democratic majority.  Following Supreme Court precedent as to when "party affiliation is an appropriate requirement for the effective performance" of an office, Branti v. Finkel, 445 U.S. 507 (1980), Judge Vanaskie determined that the plaintiff's former position fell within the Supreme Court's definitional ambit and, consequently, granted the defendant's motion for summary judgment.

Judge Vanaskie has ruled in two interesting Free Exercise Clause cases.  In Black Hawk v. Pennsylvania, 225 F. Supp. 2d 465 (M.D. Pa. 2002), he issued a permanent injunction barring the Pennsylvania Game Commission from destroying a bear that was a central component of the plaintiff's religious beliefs because the Commission's exemption policies violated the Free Exercise Clause.  The plaintiff, a Native American holy man who conducted spiritual ceremonies for other Native Americans in which he used the bear, had appealed to the Commission for a religious exemption to spare the bear's life, but was denied the exemption without explanation even though the Commission offered similar exemptions for non-religious purposes.  The Third Circuit Court of Appeals, in a unanimous decision written by then-Judge Samuel Alito, affirmed Judge Vanaskie's ruling.  Black Hawk v. Pennsylvania, 381 F.3d 202 (3d Cir. 2004).  In the second case, Smith v. Kyler, No. 1:CV-03-0898, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12586, (M.D. Pa. Feb. 20, 2008), aff'd, No. 08-1731, 2008 U.S. App. LEXIS 21341 (3d Cir. Oct. 9, 2008), a Rastafarian prisoner alleged that the prison warden had violated his free exercise rights by denying the prisoner's requests for a weekly group prayer service led by a prayer leader.  Judge Vanaskie ruled that though the plaintiff retained his First Amendment right to a reasonable opportunity to exercise his religious beliefs while in prison, the warden had legitimate penological interests in denying the request and the prisoner had alternative means of exercising his religion.  In short, Judge Vanaskie found that there was insufficient interest by inmates in weekly services to warrant the expense of paying for a leader, that the prisoners had failed to present or suggest an acceptable volunteer leader, and that the Rastafarian prisoners could have individual visits with religious advisors, had been granted hair-length exemptions, and could obtain and possess religious materials in their cells.

Judge Vanaskie also handled an important and procedurally interesting case, Mariani v. United States, No. 3:CV-98-1701, 1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 20618 (M.D. Pa. Mar. 25, 1999), involving the validity of portions of the Federal Election Campaign Act ("FECA").  Procedurally, a section of FECA assigned constitutional challenges to the Act to an en banc hearing of the appropriate court of appeals, not to the district court.  District court judges were tasked with determining, in the first instance, whether the challenge was frivolous.  If not frivolous, the district court judge had to certify the issues to be resolved to the appellate court and make findings of fact, but could not rule on the underlying legal issues themselves.  In Mariani, Judge Vanaskie found that the challenge was not frivolous, certified the case to the circuit court, and made findings of fact in an exhaustive, 213 page opinion.  The opinion is notable for Judge Vanaskie's meticulous attention to detail and for his factual conclusions that "[c]orporate soft money contributions enable corporations to do that which the corporate hard money ban is intended to avoid: corporate support of candidates for office," and that "[c]orporations are now able to make expenditures in connection with federal elections that have the ability to corrupt and cause an appearance of corruption that the ban on corporate contributions to candidates for federal elective office was intended to avoid."

Judge Vanaskie has decided a number of pro se First Amendment retaliation claims brought by prisoners against their wardens.  In several cases, he determined that the prisoners' claims were meritless.  For example, in Alexander v. Forr, No. 3:CV-04-0370, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 70002 (M.D. Pa. Sept. 27, 2006), aff'd, No. 06-4467, 2008 U.S. App. LEXIS 18682 (3d Cir. Aug. 28, 2008), Judge Vanaskie granted the warden's motion for summary judgment because the evidence showed that the prisoner was transferred to another facility for penological, not retaliatory, purposes.  Similarly, in Holbrook v. Walters, No. 3:CV-03-0033, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 25113 (M.D. Pa. Apr. 4, 2007), aff'd, No. 08-2080, 2008 U.S. App. LEXIS 21679 (3d Cir. Oct. 14, 2008), he granted the warden's motion for summary judgment because the warden proved that he took adverse action against the prisoner due to security considerations.  In other cases, however, Judge Vanaskie has ruled for the pro se plaintiffs.  For instance, in Nunez v. Renda, No. 3:CV-05-1763, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 86280 (M.D. Pa. Sept. 3, 2008), he denied the warden's motion for summary judgment after finding that there was a genuine issue of material fact as to whether a prisoner's transfer from library work to landscaping work would deter the prisoner from exercising his First Amendment rights.  Similarly, in Brooks v. Smith, No. 3:CV-04-2680, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 82371 (M.D. Pa. Nov. 6, 2007), he entered judgment for the prisoner after presiding over a bench trial during which the defendants made numerous contradictory statements about why they sent the plaintiff to the Special Housing Unit for three and a half months.

He has taken a similarly balanced approach to First Amendment retaliation claims brought by government employees against their employers.  For instance, in Breiner v. Litwhiler, 245 F. Supp. 2d 614 (M.D. Pa. 2003), aff'd, No. 03-1543, 2004 U.S. App. LEXIS 5400 (3d Cir. Mar. 24, 2004), he granted the defendants' motion for summary judgment because there was no evidence that the plaintiff was denied promotion due to her affiliation with a private, charitable organization.  By contrast, in Deluzio v. Monroe County, No. 3:CV:-00-1220, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 78900 (M.D. Pa. Oct. 30, 2006), aff'd, No. 06-5044, 2008 U.S. App. LEXIS 6961 (3d Cir. Mar. 31, 2008), Judge Vanaskie upheld a jury verdict in favor of a county social worker whose employer fired him because he spoke out against county policies that put children at risk of severe harm.    

Environment

Judge Vanaskie has dealt with relatively few environmental cases but appears to bring a practical and pragmatic view to this area of the law.  In several cases, Judge Vanaskie has been asked to rule on the scope of a provision in a settlement agreement between a polluter and the Environmental Protection Agency that provides, pursuant to CERCLA Section 113(f)(2), that a party who has settled with the United States cannot be sued for contribution by any private party with respect to matters addressed in the settlement agreement.  In an early case addressing this issue, Waste Management v. City of York, 910 F. Supp. 1035 (M.D. Pa. 1995), Judge Vanaskie ruled, contrary to the argument and caselaw presented by the defendant and the United States, that the contribution protection afforded by CERCLA to a party settling with the United States only extends to clean-up costs incurred by the United States.  This narrow view of CERCLA's contribution protection clause is not the view later adopted by the Third Circuit, see, e.g. United States v. Southeastern Pa. Transp. Auth., 235 F.3d 817 (3d Cir. 2000), and was criticized by commentators.  See, e.g., John M. Hyson, "CERCLA Settlements, Contribution Protection and Fairness to Non-Settling Responsible Parties," 10 Vill. Envtl. L.J. 277 (1999).  When presented with a similar claim eight years later, after Third Circuit precedent existed and the law was generally more developed, Judge Vanaskie applied existing law and found that the contribution protection provided by settlement agreements with EPA protected the settling parties from suit by Alcan.  Alcan Aluminum Corp. v. Butler Aviation, 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 16435 (M.D. Pa. Sept.19, 2003).

In United States v. Alcan Aluminum Corp., 892 F. Supp. 648 (M.D. Pa. 1995), Judge Vanaskie presided over a case involving hazardous waste pollution in Susquehanna River.  The United States initially filed a complaint against twenty defendants who were each alleged to have disposed of hazardous substances into the river.  One of the defendants, Alcan, argued that it should not be held liable at all because the amounts of hazardous waste contained in the waste emulsion it released into the river were lower than the ambient levels of those chemicals in the river.  Both Judge Vanaskie and the Third Circuit rejected this argument but gave Alcan a chance to prove that it should only be liable for a portion of the cleanup costs equal to its equitable share of the pollution.  See United States v. Alcan Aluminum Corp., 964 F.2d 252, 269 (3rd Cir. 1992); U.S. v. Alcan, 892 F. Supp. at 650-651.  Alcan, however, did not present any evidence or argument relating whether its share of the pollution was divisible and thus, pursuant to the general rule of joint and several liability in CERCLA cases, Judge Vanaskie granted summary judgment for the United States and ordered Alcan to pay $ 473,790.18 (an amount equal to the unreimbursed response costs of the United States).

Labor

Judge Vanaskie's decisions under the Fair Labor Standards Act ("FLSA") show neither a bias for or against labor plaintiffs.  Judge Vanaskie has liberally construed plaintiffs' rights under Fair Labor Standards Act ("FLSA"), when defendants have sought to limit such rights to those under a collective bargaining agreement ("CBA").  For example, in Gallagher, et. al v. Lackawanna County, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 43772 (M.D. Pa 2008), plaintiffs, who were all Lackawanna County Corrections Officers, sought to recover wages for required pre-shift meetings and post-shift paperwork.  Although the plaintiffs were party to a union collective bargaining agreement that required them to follow certain grievance procedures, they filed suit alleging violations of FLSA because the county failed to pay overtime for the required pre-shift and post-shift work   Judge Vanaskie denied the defendant's motion to dismiss holding that although the FLSA and collective bargaining agreement may overlap, there is a strong distinction between statutory protections and contractual agreements.  As a result, he held that the CBA did not prevent the plaintiff's from filing suit under the FLSA without going through the CBA grievance procedures.  However, he took a more conservative position with respect to computing the statutory minimum hourly rate under FLSA, by applying a workweek standard instead of a per-hour standard.  See Masterson v. Fed. Express Co., 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 99622 (M.D. Pa. 2008). 

Employment Discrimination

  In employment discrimination cases, Judge Vanaskie seems inclined to allow plaintiffs' cases proceed to discovery or trial when there is evidence of discrimination.  Conversely, Judge Vanaskie will grant a defendant's motion to end the case if the facts or the law require it.

With respect to age discrimination cases, it appears that Judge Vanaskie is willing to allow a plaintiff to proceed to trial when the plaintiff has any evidence that could support a discrimination claim.  In Faust v. Scranton Petro, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 25713 (M.D. Pa 2008), Judge Vanaskie allowed an ADEA claim to go forward where the plaintiff, a travel plaza manager, showed that she performed well at her job and was given more responsibility than other plaza managers, but when the company made staff cuts, she was fired and replaced with a younger person.  The plaintiff also had a witness who would testify that the defendant made remarks regarding plaintiff's age.  Because those remarks created questions of fact, Judge Vanaskie denied summary judgment with respect to the Age Discrimination in Employment Act ("ADEA") claim.  But see Slotterback v. H.H. Knoebel Sons, Inc., 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 31432 (M.D. Pa 2009) (granting summary judgment for defendants after finding that although the company employed plaintiff for over 30 years and promoted him, company had sufficient non-age related reasons under the ADEA for terminating employment including employees admission that he took long breaks and failed to generate business);

Similarly, Judge Vanaskie attempts to preserve discrimination claims brought under the Americans with Disabilities Act ("ADA") where plaintiffs have some evidence of discrimination.  For example, in Supinski v. UPS, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3143 (M.D. Pa 2009), although he granted the defendant UPS's motion for summary judgment based on the fact that the plaintiff's work related injury did not, in fact, substantially limit any major life activity, he denied summary judgment on the claim that defendant perceived Mr. Supinski as disabled.  Judge Vanaskie found that facts could support an inference of discrimination because one of plaintiff's supervisors stated that "we don't bring cripples back," and UPS failed to provide reasonable accommodations upon request.  (preserving a plaintiff's claim that her employer failed to accommodate her multiple sclerosis and terminated her based on disability).  However, in Zalepa v. Cornerstone Techs., 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 34246 (M.D. Pa. Nov. 30, 2005), Judge Vanaskie granted summary judgment for the defendant where a plaintiff alleged perceived disability discrimination because there was "no evidence that [defendant] Cornerstone regarded [plaintiff] Zalepa as disabled."  Similarly striking a balance between access to justice and requiring a party to meet its burden, in Evans v. Maui Cup-Letita Corp., 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 42435 (M.D. Pa. 2009), Judge Vanaskie granted a defendant's motion to dismiss for failure to  plead a sufficient ADA claim, but allowing plaintiff to refile so that he could try to cure the defects in his original pleading.

In sex discrimination cases, Judge Vanaskie generously reads facts to preserve claims.  For example, in Santos v. Luzerne County Community College, U.S. Dist LEXIS 71884 (M.D. Pa 2009), he only granted partial summary judgment where the plaintiff failed to establish that she was a victim of pay discrimination.  However, Judge Vanaskie denied summary judgment on the retaliation claim because the facts indicated that the College's non-discriminatory reasons for termination were not credible.  In Hartley v. Pocono Mountain Reg. Police Dept., 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 20254 (M.D. Pa 2007), plaintiff was a female police officer who filed a sexual harassment suit against her police department and supervisor.  Plaintiff claimed that other officers continually failed to answer calls or actually appear to provide backup and her supervisors generally ignored her protests.  Defendants sought summary judgment by arguing that because the police department did not have a formal sexual harassment policy and had limited training they should not be liable for a hostile work environment claim.  Judge Vanaskie rejected this argument and denied defendants' summary judgment motion with respect to both the sexual harassment and the hostile work environment claims.  See also Martinelli v. Penn Millers Insurance Co., 2005 U.S. Dist. 36694 (M.D. Pa 2005) (preserving a disparate pay claim, but denying a hostile work environment claim where defendants provided proof of system wide cut backs).

Deprivations of Constitutional Rights

In analyzing claims for deprivation of constitutional rights, Judge Vanaskie has ruled for plaintiffs and defendants.  While he seems to rule in favor of defendants more often than plaintiffs, most of his opinions demonstrate careful consideration of plaintiffs' arguments.  

In a case before Judge Vanaskie that went to the Supreme Court, Judge Vanaskie considered whether the Due Process Clause required that an employee get notice and a hearing before he was demoted and suspended without pay after he were arrested for drug crimes.  Judge Vanaskie held that pre-suspension notice and hearing was not required, the Third Circuit reversed, and the Supreme Court ultimately reversed the Third Circuit and remanded for a determination of whether the plaintiff had an adequate post-suspension hearing.  Homar v. Gilbert, 89 F.3d 1009 (3d Cir. 1996), rev'd 520 U.S. 924 (1997).  On remand, Judge Vanaskie reviewed Supreme Court and Third Circuit precedent and rejected the plaintiff's argument that his hearing was not promptly held after his suspension.  Homar v. Gilbert, 63 F. Supp. 2d 559 (M.D. Pa. 1999).  Judge Vanaskie also very carefully considered the plaintiff's argument that his position as a campus security officer was a protected property right and concluded that "public employment is not a 'fundamental' property interest that implicates substantive due process where an individual, non-legislative employment decision is at issue."  Id. at 576. 

However, Judge Vanaskie, in Erb v. Borough of Catawissa, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 90342 (M.D. Pa. Sept. 30, 2009), refused to dismiss the plaintiff's due process claims where the plaintiff alleged that she was forced to resign as borough secretary so that her job could be given to the wife of one of the defendants, and that the defendants also put out negative stories about her to the media.  Judge Vanaskie held: "Under these circumstances, Ms. Erb's constructive discharge, followed by the allegedly false publicity, implicated a liberty interest in her reputation such that she was entitled under the United States Constitution to an opportunity to clear her name by way of a name-clearing hearing."

In a typically balanced opinion, Judge Vanaskie ruled for an inmate on his claim of excessive force and against an inmate on his claim that his due process rights were violated.  In Barndt v. Pucci, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 15902 (M.D. Pa. March 3, 2008), Judge Vanaskie held that the plaintiff's Eighth Amendment claim could go forward because the versions of the facts described by the plaintiff and defendant were totally different and the resolution of this question of fact depended on a credibility assessment that could not be made on summary judgment.  Judge Vanaskie also held that the inmate's Due Process claim failed because, although he was placed in disciplinary confinement after he was charged with assaulting the defendant, that confinement was not an unusually significant hardship giving rise to a constitutional claim.

One opinion that gives us pause, however is Judge Vanaskie's decision, reversed on appeal by the Third Circuit, that dismissed a pro-se inmate's complaint for failure to adequately plead an Eighth Amendment claim of deliberate indifference to serious medical needs.  Chimenti v. Mohadjerin, 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 28332 (M.D. Pa. Mar. 15, 2002), rev'd by 133 Fed. Appx. 833 (3d Cir. Pa. 2005).  In that case, the plaintiff alleged that he entered prison with Hepatitis C, but because of the lack of a prison protocol for treating Hepatitis C, his drug regimen was discontinued by a prison doctor.  As a result, his liver failed and he required a transplant.  Judge Vanaskie ruled that these allegations did not meet the standard for a viable claim.  The Third Circuit disagreed and remanded the case.  In subsequent proceedings, Judge Vanaskie ruled for the plaintiff in some instances and for defendants in others.  He granted the defendant doctor's motion to dismiss some of the claims against him, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 17038 (M.D. Pa. Feb. 13, 2006), granted the plaintiff's motion for appointment of counsel (despite having denied a similar motion at the outset of the case), 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 32960 (M.D. Pa. May 24, 2006), and denied the summary judgment motion of the named prison official, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 48379 (M.D. Pa. June 24, 2008).

It should also be noted the Judge Vanaskie has not had any case before him that presented constitutional issues related to a woman's right to choose.  Thus, his legal views on the topic are unknown. 

Criminal Law

Judge Vanaskie's rulings in criminal cases, although pro-government in most instances, show a careful attention to the law and facts.  While his pro-government rulings are to be expected, Judge Vanaskie considered defendants' arguments and has provided relief to criminal defendants when the law requires.

For example, in United States v. Fauver, 888 F. Supp. 668  (M.D. Pa. 1995), Judge Vanaskie dismissed a count of federal mail fraud in an indictment finding the government had incorrectly charged defendant.  Similarly, in United States v. Lamplugh, 17 F. Supp. 2d 354 (M.D. Pa. 1998), he dismissed a federal perjury charge, ruling that the charging statute did not criminalize statements made in affidavits submitted to a court. 

In a series of cases involving allegations of illegal campaign contributions, obstruction of justice, and perjury (including by a state legislator), Judge Vanaskie ruled on a number of motions that demonstrate his fair consideration of the facts and arguments presented.  For example, Judge Vanaskie struck from the indictment one of six allegedly perjurious statements.  United States v. Mariani, 7 F. Supp. 2d 529 (M.D. Pa. 1998), affd. 167 F.3d 812 (3d Cir. 1999).  In an opinion issued shortly thereafter, Judge Vanaskie also refused to compel the prosecutor to disclose the identity of all unindicted co-conspirators or to disclose impeachment evidence until a week before trial, but did order the government to promptly disclose exculpatory evidence. United States v. Mariani, 7 F. Supp. 2d 556 (M.D. Pa. 1998).  And, in another related ruling, United States v. Mariani, 178 F.R.D. 447 (M.D. Pa. 1998), Judge Vanaskie entered a protective order that prevented the government from subjecting an elderly relative of two of the defendants to a deposition.  Based on the evidence presented, Judge Vanaskie ruled that the man the government wanted to depose suffered from late-stage, terminal heart disease and that he had shown that the deposition presented a substantial threat to his life.  Judge Vanaskie also refused the government's alternative request for limited questioning, finding that limited questioning could violate defendants' Sixth Amendment Confrontation rights because the government's proposed restrictions would preclude vigorous cross-examination by the defense.

After three of the defendants pled guilty, Judge Vanaskie granted most of the government's requests for sentence enhancements, but also found defendants were entitled to sentence reductions for their acceptance of responsibility under the Sentencing Guidelines.  United States v. Mariani, 212 F. Supp. 2d 361 (M.D. Pa. 2002).  And, years later, Judge Vanaskie granted the request made by one of the defendants, over the objections of the Bureau of Prisons, that he be permitted to serve the last six months of his prison term in a halfway house.  Serafini v. Dodrill, 325 F. Supp. 2d 535 (M.D. Pa. 2004).

Conclusion

In nominating Judge Vanaskie to the Third Circuit Court of Appeals, President Obama selected a thoughtful and fair-minded judge.  His record indicates that, overall, he approaches cases with an open mind, and considers the law and facts carefully before ruling.  We commend the President for picking a nominee with a strong voice who appears committed to our nation's core constitutional values.

» AFJ Report on Thomas I. Vanaskie (pdf)